We must guard our farm gatesPublished on 05/17/2007By David White, OFBF senior director of policy research and development "When we have a free path, we go forward. If we meet an obstacle, we go around it. If the object cannot be overcome, we retreat. When the enemy is unprepared, we surprise him. If he is alert, we leave him alone!" This quote from a terrorist group truly demonstrates why agriculture should be prepared and attentive to potential acts of terrorism. Since 9/11, there has been an increased awareness of the vulnerability of various agricultural sectors. Yet concern exists, as many sectors are considered soft targets. For example, agricultural, chemical and petroleum facilities present viable targets for terrorists who want to develop and use weapons of mass destruction. National response plans have been developed that address these threats as the protection and integrity of production agriculture and the food supply are essential to national security. Agriculture ranks among the most crucial of our nation’s industries, accounting for 13 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, 18 percent of its employment and $140 billion in revenue. Attacks against agriculture are not new and have been conducted or considered throughout history. Intelligence indicates that terrorists have discussed various components. A determined terrorist could find a great deal of factual information regarding pathogens and dissemination techniques, as manuals for intentional contamination are widely available. National security experts claim that it would be relatively easy for terrorists to carry out such a plan in the United States with the passive surveillance system that is in place. Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness to employ asymmetrical warfare to achieve their goals. Agroterrorism – defined as the deliberate introduction, use or threatened use of a biological, chemical, toxin, nuclear, radiological or explosive agent against one or more ag sectors with the goal of causing mortality and morbidity, generating fear, including economic losses or undermining sector stability and confidence in the government – represents one such class of non-traditional warfare. The use of biological or chemical weapons could cause mass casualties. Even an ineffective attack could cause significant economic and psychological damage. As a pro-active measure, efforts should be undertaken at all levels to create a food defense system, which is different than a system of food safety. Food defense is the protection of food products from intentional adulteration by biological, chemical, physical or radiological agents. In contrast, food safety is defined as the protection of food products from unintentional contamination by agents. The prevention of intentional or unintentional injury to crops or livestock is of primary concern in pre-harvest agricultural production. Threats to farm security are varied and numerous. By following pre-harvest security guidelines, farmers can do their part – be the first line of defense by reducing security risks at the farm level. Each producer should establish a set of guidelines and review a checklist, developed by USDA and available in the "Featured Links" section of www.ofbf.org, to determine which recommendations are most appropriate for his or her operation as it relates to security. Farmers and rural residents should also be on the look out for signs of terrorism. Any such sign or suspicion, including threats, harassment or intimidation, should be reported immediately to law enforcement officials. Nothing should be taken for granted or rationalized away as it could be the missing link to a puzzle law enforcement officials are attempting to solve. In the past, law enforcement and food/agriculture regulatory agencies commonly conducted separate and independent investigations. An attack against agriculture, however, requires a high level of cooperation between law enforcement and regulatory agencies to achieve the objective of identifying the threat, preventing the spread of the disease or further contamination of a product, preventing public panic and apprehending those responsible. Therefore, on-going dialogue should be established among all stakeholders. Once meaningful dialogue has been initiated, the continuation of this dialogue must be maintained to improve existing relationships and promote new relationships between stakeholders. These relationships will aid both the industry and the response community should a situation develop. | |




